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Abstract 
This study documents a decline in the levels of corporate ownership concentration between 1996 and 
2007. When compared to previous studies, the incidence of ownership stakes of 20% or larger has 
decreased form 60% to 41% of the total population of publicly listed Canadian firms. Regional disparities 
among provinces remain important. Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia have the most widely-held 
firms, while Quebec and Atlantic Canada show the most concentrated corporate ownership patterns. The 
interpretation of these results requires a complex understanding of historical, demographic, cultural, 
political and institutional factors.  
JEL classification: F52, G32, K22, L25, O51, P16 
Keywords: Canada, corporate ownership, corporate governance, blockholder, ownership stake, 
ownership concentration 
1. Introduction 
  This present study employs a very recent and large sample of TSX listed firms 
and aims to re-evaluate the empirical evidence on corporate ownership in Canada. It is 
shown here that blockholding remains rather common, yet the widely-held firm has 
become more prevalent over the last ten years
3. Regional disparities persist, but unlike 
previous studies that single out Quebec, this one finds that Eastern Canada as a whole 
(including Quebec) displays a more pronounced tendency towards concentrated 
ownership. We define blockholders as shareholders who control 10% or more of the 
total votes of the firm. A footnote on CEO compensation suggests that pay-
performance is lower for closely held firms and for very large firms as measured by the 
size of their assets. Previous studies have interpreted their findings mainly by making 
reference to law regimes, taxation, and corporate governance regulation. Here, we 
acknowledge the insight of Bebchiuk and Roe (1999) with respect to path dependence, 
and we conjecture an explanation based on the eclectic interaction among economic, 
political, geographic, cultural, and institutional factors.  
  This study is organized as follows. Section two provides a brief discussion of the 
literature. Data is presented in section three. Empirical results are presented in sections 
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3  A handful of studies began only recently to systematically investigate corporate ownership patterns in 
Canada [Morck et al. (2000), Morck and Yeung (2004), Attig et al. (2004), Bozec and Laurin (2004, 2006), 
and Gadhoum (2006)]. Using data from the mid-1990s, they found that Canadian corporations are far less 
widely held than their American or British counterparts.  
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four through eight. A brief discussion and interpretation of results is provided in 
sections nine. Section ten concludes. 
2. The Current Record on Corporate Ownership in Canada 
 The commentators of Canadian economic history have always noted the 
concentration of economic power in the hands of a small yet influential elite. This view 
made its way into mainstream culture through the works of historians, such as Naylor 
(1975), Bliss (1986), Norrie and Owram (1991), and Taylor and Baskerville (1994), and 
through the accounts published by columnists such as Peter C. Newman (1977, 1991, 
and 1998) and Diane Francis (1986, 2008).  
 Recently, a handful of academic studies provide a systematic review of the 
empirical evidence on Canadian corporate ownership. This line of research has emerged 
in the 1990s, and builds on the increasing interest shown towards the understanding of 
various systems of corporate finance within the larger framework provided by legal 
systems, culture, tradition, and religion. La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) provide two 
landmark studies; the authors attempt to tally and compare various corporate 
governance arrangements around the world. The primary motivation of this approach 
was to raise awareness that outside the United States and Britain the modern 
corporation did not quite match the widely-held ownership model advanced by Adolf 
Bearle and Gardiner Means (1932), and popularized by John Kenneth Galbraith (1971) 
and Alfred Chandler (1977); hence, many corporate governance scholars set out to 
document and debate this intriguing state of affairs [Zingales (1994), Schleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Becht and Roell (1999), Claessens et al. (2002), Faccio and Lang (2002), 
Anderson and Reeb (2003), Denis and  McConnell (2003), Nenova (2003), Stulz and 
Williamson (2003), and Dyck and Zingales (2004)].  
  La Porta et al. (1999) report high ownership concentration for a small sample of 
Canadian corporations. Using data from the same historical period, Gadhoum (2006) 
and Bozec and Laurin (2004 and 2006) confirm these findings. About 60% of Canadian 
firms publicly traded in the mid-1990s have ownership stakes of 20% or higher. These 
two latter studies warrant our close attention because they take a more nuanced look at 
regional ownership structures. There appears to be a certain degree of differentiation 
between Quebec and the rest of the country.  Up to 80% of Quebec firms show 
ownership stakes at the 20% cut-off. These regional differences are attributed to the 
particularities of the civil law regime, following the insights provided by La Porta et al. 
(1998).  Bozec and Laurin (2006) note that Quebec firms are subject to conflicting 
regulation: they must comply with both provincial and federal corporate laws. While the 
Canada Business Corporations Act is very similar to other common-law legislation in 
terms of investor protection, the Companies Act of Quebec is less stringent than its 
federal counterpart.  
 Morck et al (2000) associate the concentration of ownership with lower 
productivity growth and sub-par economic performance. They even coin a new term for 
this predicament, calling it the “Canadian disease.” There are several other similar 
studies that analyze corporate performance in relation to ownership. [Eckbo and 
Thorburn (2000), André et al. (2006), and Ben Amar and André (2006)]. Calin Valsan, 2007: A Canadian Corporate Ownership Survey 
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  A concise, yet insightful historical account of corporate ownership in Canada is 
provided by Morck et al (2003). The authors make several contentions that elucidate to 
some extent the nature of Canadian capitalism. First, Canadian corporations have their 
roots in a tradition of mercantilism going back to the colonial era predating the 
Confederation. Second, domestic taxation of inheritances played a major role in the rise 
and subsequent decline of the widely-held firm. Third, the re-emergence of the 
mercantilist state in the 1970s in the form of Trudeau-style dirigisme has favored 
closely-held over widely-held firms because the former category proved more apt in 
dealing with the omniscient government bureaucracy. Under the cover of promoting a 
marked nationalistic agenda (which has long been a part of the Canadian political 
discourse), the capitalist elite re-asserted its control over the Canadian economy in 
exchange for support for the welfare state. In the end, Morck et al (2003) muse over the 
apparent quandary surrounding Canadian corporate ownership: pyramids and 
concentrated ownership structures are usually associated with developing countries and 
low-trust economic settings, because they supplant investor rights and reduce the scope 
for other moral hazards. Canada is not, however a developing country. The quality of its 
institutional framework is as good as in UK, for example, yet corporate ownership 
patterns are dramatically different [Attig and Gadhoum (2003)].  One has to conclude 
that the only explanation one could advance here pertains to the nature of private 
benefits of control associated with large shareholders [Barclay and Holderness (1989)].  
 Citing several regulatory anachronisms, Morck and Yeung (2006) plead for a 
substantial reform of corporate governance in Canada. The authors blame the dividend 
tax regime, dual-class shares, and other regulation causing a substantial incongruence 
between cash flow and control rights. As such, corporate governance in Canada is at 
grips with two types of agency conflicts: one pitting managers against shareholders, and 
the other pitching blockholders against smaller shareholders.  
 There is no doubt that globalization and financial liberalization must have 
certainly played an important role in increasing the awareness of and curiosity towards 
comparative corporate governance systems. A majority of studies cited earlier would 
have not been possible a quarter of a century ago. World-wide liberalization of trade and 
finance has contributed to a relative convergence of economic systems. Paradoxically, 
this increase in openness has brought to the fore the glaring differences that remain 
among various systems of corporate finance. A certain leveling of the playing field has 
lightened the task of studies endeavoring to identify salient factors that make a 
difference in corporate governance. 
  Most studies on Canadian corporate ownership use 1996 data. The size of the 
samples used is rather small, with one notable exception [Gadhoum (2006)]. Studies 
employing data collected before or during 1996 might have missed some of the time-
lagged effects induced by the latest wave of financial liberalization and economic 
globalization that started in earnest in the early 1990s. It is only legitimate to presume 
that these trends might have had a conspicuous impact on Canada. As it will be shown 
later, our main results corroborate earlier findings, but also reveal a trend towards an 
increase in wider-held ownership across the board.   
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
288 
3. Data 
 The sample used here consists of 1,452 firms listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange in the spring of 2007. The data include financial, ownership, and various 
corporate governance information.  
 Financial information pertains to total assets, liabilities, revenue, and market 
capitalization. The sources of data are the most recent annual reports (end of 2006) filed 
with the Ontario Securities Commission, provided by the System for Electronic Document 
Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR). Total and long-term debt ratios are estimated by dividing 
total debt and long-term debt respectively by total assets. Sales to assets ratios are 
calculated by dividing annual sales by total assets.  ROA and ROE is calculated by 
dividing net income by total assets and owner’s equity. Average market capitalization is 
estimated by taking the average of the previous 52 weeks low and high stock prices, 
multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. Market-to-book ratios are calculated by 
dividing average market capitalization by owner’s equity.  
 Data on ownership is obtained from the most recent management proxy 
circular. This circular usually indicates the significant blockholders and the size of their 
stake. Blockholders are shareholders who control 10% or more of the total votes of the 
firm. We need to know who owns 10% or more of total votes in order to calculate 
cumulative blockholder (ownership) stakes. Cumulative blockholder (ownership) stakes 
are estimated by adding the votes of all blockholders in each firm.  For example, if a 
firm has two blockolders controlling 13% and 16% of votes respectively, then 
cumulative blockholder ownership equals 29%. 
 While it is usual to use both 10% and 20% cutoff points as thresholds of 
cumulative ownership concentration, here we focus only on the 20% cutoff because it is 
more stringent and produces more conservative estimations.  The number of firms with 
20% (50%) ownership stakes is simply calculated by counting the number of firms in 
which cumulative blockholder (ownership) stakes account for at least 20% (50%) of 
total votes. The average number of votes per share has been obtained by dividing the 
total number of votes by the total number of shares, regardless of their class. For 
example, if a company has 1 million class-A shares with ten votes each and 20 million 
class-B shares with one vote each, the number of average votes per share equals 1.43 (10 
million votes + 20 million votes)/(21 million shares).  
 Several studies have attempted to establish the nature and identity of the 
ultimate owners, either by examining direct ownership stakes, or by following the 
control  thread across pyramidal ownership structures [(La Porta et all (1999), Attig et al 
(2004),  Bozec and Laurin (2006)]. Unarguably, this approach has many merits, but also 
some potential pitfalls. In many instances, control can be exercised indirectly, through 
interlocking shareholdings and through many smaller stakes that do not make the 10% 
cutoff, and hence go unreported. For the sake of consistency and conservatism, this 
study counts only direct ownership stakes reported in the management proxy circular. 
While it might conceivably underestimate the extent of ownership concentration and its 
complexity, it calculates firm and reliable lower limits to its magnitude.  
 As well, data on corporate governance is obtained from the most recent 
management proxy circular as well. CEO cash pay is estimated by aggregating base Calin Valsan, 2007: A Canadian Corporate Ownership Survey 
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salaries and cash bonuses. CEO performance pay is estimated by aggregating the value 
of stock options and restricted shares granted.  
  The total number of TSX listed firms is slightly larger than 1,452. Corporations 
in the process of being de-listed, amalgamated, dissolved, spun-off, or under bankruptcy 
proceedings were excluded from the final sample. In the case of several observations, 
financial, ownership, or governance information is partially missing, either because it is 
not being disclosed, or because it does not appear accurate when cross-checked against 
other sources, such as the Financial Post and the System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders 
(SEDI).  
4. Results 
  Table 1 presents several ownership statistics by province. Overall, 41%, or 600 
of the total 1,452 TSX listed firms show combined ownership stakes of 20% or more 
(Table 1, Panel A). A number of 288 of the total 1,452 firms have blockholders in 
uncontested control of their corporations, commanding 50% or more of total votes. 
The average cumulative blockholding stake is 23%, while the median is only 13%. The 
board of the average TSX-listed firm has about six members, of which four are 
classified as “independent.”  The CEO of the average firm is paid about $1.5 million in 
annual compensation, of which about 80% is performance pay. The median CEO 
receives roughly $430,000 annually, of which about 70% is performance pay. As easily 
noted, the distribution of data (according to an overwhelming majority of 
characteristics) is very skewed, with one exception: board size.  
  The largest province, Ontario leads the country as the preferred destination of 
Canadian corporations. Slightly under 700 firms, or almost half of the entire population 
of TSX listed firms are headquartered there. In the last 30 years, Ontario has become 
the economic engine of Canada, and it is not surprising to see such a large proportion of 
listed firms in this province. Alberta trails Ontario as the second largest province of 
destination for publicly listed TSX firms; it is home to 281 corporations. British 
Columbia occupies the third place with 191, and Quebec comes in the fourth place, with 
only 159 firms. The prairies provinces and Atlantic Canada are home to another 55 
firms. The difference between these numbers and the total of 1,452 is represented by 
foreign listings.  
  According to this paper's estimation, the domestic market capitalization of the 
TSX edged above $2,000,000,000,000 in 2006/2007 (Table 1, Panel B). This figure has 
been estimated by adding the average market capitalization of all domestic firms.   
Ontario accounts for almost half of the domestic market capitalization of the TSX. 
Firms headquartered in Alberta account for 28%, and Quebec firms account for only 
11%.  The combined market capitalization of Albertan firms is almost two and a half 
higher than that of Quebec firms.    
  
EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
290 
Table 1. Panel A: TSX listed firms by province.  
  No. of 
firms 
Cumulative 
blockholder 
votes per firm 
% 
Number of 
firms with  
20% /50% 
cumulative  
ownership 
stakes 
Directors/of 
which 
independent 
Executive 
share 
holding 
% 
CEO cash 
pay 
($ mil) 
CEO 
performance 
pay 
($ mil) 
British Columbia  191             
Mean    23.8%  78/33  5.9/4.3  1.97%  $0.52  $0.63 
Median   14.8%  -  6/4  0%  $0.16  $0.21 
Standard deviation    27.5%  -  2.5/2.3  5.4%  $1.3  $0.87 
Alberta  281             
Mean    17.9%  92/36  6.3/4.6  10%  $0.35  $1.2 
Median   10%  -  6/5  0%  $0.15  $0.3 
Standard deviation    25.4%  -  2.6/2.5  124.9%  $0.7  $2.6 
Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan  27             
Mean    31.4%  12/10  7/5.7  0.22%  $0.18  $1.6 
Median   18.1%  -  6/4  0%  $0.4  $1.3 
Standard deviation    33.15%  -  3.93.6  0.6%  $0.8  $1.9 
Ontario   692             
Mean    21.6%  269/133  5.7/4  1.7%  $1.9  $0.96 
Median   10.8%  -  6/4  0%  $0.44  $0.2 
Standard deviation    28.4%  -  2.9/3  6.8%  $4.2  $1.7 
Quebec  159             
Mean    37.4%  100/58  7.1/5.3  2.8%  $0.5  $1.0 
Median   32.1%  -  7/5  0%  $0.3  $0.15 
Standard deviation    30.6%  -  3.4/3  8.1%  $0.8  $2.5 
New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland & 
Labrador 
28             
Mean    30.5%  15/7  6.6/4.9  1.3%  $1.2  $1.3 
Median   20.3%  -  6/4  0%  $0.1  $0.8 
Standard deviation    32.1%  -  3.7/3.1  3.1%  $2.4  $1.2 
All TSX  1,452             
Mean    23.4%  600/288  6.1/4.3  3.4%  $0.3  $1.2 
Median   13.0%  -  6/4  0%  $0.13  $0.3 
Standard deviation    7.4%  -  0.1/0.2  2.4%  $0.3  $0.6 
Blockholders are shareholders who control 10% or more of firm’s votes. Cumulative blockholder votes per firm are estimated by aggregating the votes of all blockholders. The number of firms with 20% 
(50%) ownership stakes is obtained by counting the firms in which blockholders control at least 20% (50%) of total votes. CEO cash pay is estimated by aggregating base salaries and cash bonuses. 
CEO performance pay is estimated by aggregating the value of stock option and restricted shares granted as reported in the management proxy circular. 
 
The differences between Eastern and Western Canada are already visible. In Alberta, the resource-driven boom has produced strong 
economic growth, attracted entrepreneurs, labor, and augmented economic prosperity. Here, publicly listed corporations are more dynamic, 
tend to grow faster, and appear more widely held. Of 281 firms, only 92, or about one third have cumulative ownership stakes of 20% or 
more of total votes (Table 1, Panel A).  Calin Valsan, 2007: A Canadian Corporate Ownership Survey 
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Table 1. Panel B: Average market capitalization of domestic firms by province.  
Province 
Number 
of firms 
 
Average market 
capitalization 
per firm ('000) 
Total average 
market 
capitalization 
('000) 
Percentage 
of total 
British 
Columbia  191 $756.1  $144,415.0  6.72% 
Alberta  281  $2,142.6  $602,070.6  28.02% 
Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan  27 $3,836.2  $103,577.4  4.82% 
Ontario  692  $1,506.9  $1,042,744.8  48.54% 
Quebec  159 $1,491.1  $237,084.9  11.04% 
New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland 
& Labrador 
28  $658.7  $18,443.6  0.865 
Total domestic 
listings  1,378   $2,148,366.4  100.00% 
Average market capitalization is estimated by talking the average of the previous 52 weeks low and high stock 
prices, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. 
 
The average cumulative blockholding per firm is at 17%, while the median one is 
at 10%. Ontario and British Columbia show about 40% of listed firms having 
cumulative ownership stakes of 20% or more.  The average cumulative blockholding 
stake is 21% for Ontario and 23% for British Columbia. The median Ontario- and 
British Columbia-based company has only one blockholder. Arguably, firms 
headquartered in Alberta, Ontario and British Columbia are among the more widely-
held corporations in Canada. Of 27 listed firms from Manitoba and Saskatchewan, 12 
show cumulative ownership stakes at or above the 20% threshold. The average 
cumulative ownership stake is at 31%, while the median is at 12%.   
  At the other end of the spectrum, Quebec and Atlantic Canada boast the most 
concentrated ownership patterns in Canada. It is hard, however to draw meaningful 
conclusions for smaller provinces, such as New Brunswick, where the economy is 
dominated by the Irving group of companies that, in Diane Francis' words “...still run 
the province as if it is their own fiefdom (p 366),” yet  remain privately held. As such, 
available data on publicly listed firms tends to understate the extent of ownership 
concentration that underpins the economy of Atlantic Canada.  
 Quebec is also home to firms with high ownership concentration. More than 
60% of publicly listed Quebec corporations have cumulative ownership stakes of 20% 
or larger. The average firm has a cumulative ownership stake of almost 38%, while the 
median is at 32%. Both figures are the highest among all Canadian provinces.   
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  Executive shareholding is moderately low across the board. It averages just over 
3% for the entire sample (the median is equal to zero). Among provinces, only Alberta 
stands out with a 10% executive control average (again, a median equal to zero).  
  The analysis of CEO compensation numbers reveals a mixed picture. It is clear, 
however, that there is great variability in the size and composition of pay across 
provinces and within individual provinces. Average values deviate from medians 
significantly: pay scales are markedly skewed. Albertan firms stand out as having the 
highest ratio of CEO performance pay to cash compensation, almost 2:1 (according to 
median values). British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan corporations also show a 
relatively high proportion of performance pay. Ontario and Quebec firms, however,  
show lower levels of CEO performance pay relative to cash pay, about 1:2 (according to 
median values). Overall, Ontario firms have the highest level of total CEO 
compensation. 
  Tests for the significance of means and paired two-sample tests are presented in 
Table 2 (for cumulative ownership stakes). All the t-statistics for the larger provinces 
and pairs of larger provinces are significant at the 5% level. Smaller provinces have been 
grouped into two regions to overcome the scarcity of the observations: Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan form one region, and New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and NewFoundland 
& Labrador (NFL) form the second one. In spite of this, the number of observations 
remains small for Atlantic Canada, Manitoba and Saskatchewan (and the tests for the 
significance of means appear marginally significant at the 10%-11% level).  One can 
only be certain that there are statistically significant ownership differences among 
Ontario, Quebec, and Alberta on the one hand,  and among British Columbia, Alberta, 
and Quebec on the other hand.  Ontario and British Columbia appear to have similar 
ownership concentration, as statistical tests fail to reject the null hypothesis.  
 Calin Valsan, 2007: A Canadian Corporate Ownership Survey 
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Table  2.  
  British 
Columbia  Alberta  Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan  Ontario Quebec 
New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia and 
NewFoundland 
& Labrador 
British 
Columbia  12.01* -2.15*  -1.16  0.76 -4.56*  -1.3 
Alberta    11.88*  -2.13*  -1.93*  -6.79*  -2.12* 
Manitoba 
and 
Saskatchewan 
   5.49 1.6  -1.3  -0.2 
Ontario        20.04*  -5.96  -1.6 
Quebec         15.46*  -0.88 
New 
Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia 
and New 
Foundland 
          5.03 
Tests for the significance of means (on the diagonal) and paired two-sample tests (assuming unequal sample size and 
variance). The symbol * denotes the t-statistic is significant at the 5% level. The variable tested is cumulative blockholding, 
which has been calculated by adding all 10% ownership stakes for each firm.  
 
  Because tests involving smaller provinces yield statistics that are insignificant or 
only marginally significant, an alternative grouping is used; fortunately, this approach 
produces clear cut results. This time, Canadian firms have been divided into two groups: 
British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario in one group (Central 
and Western Canada), and Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and NFL in the 
second (Eastern Canada). The t-test for paired sample means is statistically significant 
(at the 5% level), indicating a considerable difference between the two groups: Eastern 
Canada has unquestionably higher levels of corporate ownership concentration than the 
rest of the country. 
5. Ownership and Size 
  The ranking of TSX listed firms according to market capitalization is presented 
in Table 3. The top 50 TSX corporations (a mere 4% of the total number of listed 
firms) account for almost 60%, and the top 500 companies account for over 83% of the 
total domestic market capitalization of the Toronto Stock Exchange (Table 3, Panel B). 
Clearly, the fortunes of the Canadian stock market ride on the wings of a few large 
corporations; as the luck of these firms change so does the welfare of Canadian 
investors. There is no secret that the Canadian economy and its stock market are 
dominated by a handful of large corporations. These numbers give a true measure of the 
scope and extent of this tremendous economic concentration.   
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Table 3. Panel A: Ranking of TSX listed firms according to market capitalization.  
 
Cumulative 
blockholder votes 
per firm % 
Number of firms 
with  20% /50% 
cumulative 
ownership stakes
Directors /of 
which 
independent 
Executive 
share holding
% 
CEO cash pay 
($mil) 
CEO 
performance 
pay ($mil) 
Largest 50 ($ mil) 
$137,197.9 - $8,688.2 
           
Mean  19.6%  16/12  10.5/9.5  0.2%  $0.8  $3.9 
Median 0%  - 12/10  0%  $0.7  $3.4 
Standard deviation  27.8%  -  4.8/3.6  0.9%  $0.7  $3.7 
Largest 100 ($ mil) 
$137,197.9 - $2,705.1 
           
Mean  18.2%  30/19  9.6/8.4  0.5%  $0.5  $3.1 
Median 0%  - 10/8  0%  $0.7  $1.6 
Standard deviation  25.6%  -  4.3/3.3  3.5%  $0.3  $4.1 
Largest 500 ($ mil) 
$137,197.9 - $266.4 
           
Mean  22.5%  197/92  7.2/5.6  1.44%  $0.7  $1.5 
Median 11.7%  - 7/5  0%  $0.3  $0.6 
Standard deviation  27.9%  -  3.4/3  5%  $1.6  $2.5 
All 1,452 TSX firms             
Mean  23.4%  600/288  6.1/4.3  3.4%  $0.3  $1.2 
Median 13.0%  - 6/4  0%  $0.13  $0.3 
Standard deviation  7.4%  -  0.1/0.2  2.4%  $0.3  $0.6 
Blockholders are shareholders who control 10% or more of firm’s votes. Cumulative blockholder votes per firm are estimated by aggregating the votes of all blockholders. The number of frms with 20% 
(50%) ownership stakes is obtained by counting the firms in which blockholders control at least 20% (50%) of total votes. CEO cash pay is estimated by aggregating base salaries and cash bonuses. 
CEO performance pay is estimated by aggregating the value of stock option and restricted shares granted as reported in the management proxy circular.  
 
Table 3. Panel B: Average market capitalization of the largest firms.  
Largest firms by market 
capitalization  Number of firms  Average market capitalization 
per firm ('000) 
Total average market 
capitalization ('000) 
Percent of 
total 
Top 50  50 $25,465.6  $1,273,280  58.0% 
Top 100  100  $14,898.7  $1,489,870  67.8% 
Top 500  500 $3,687.0  $1,843,500.0  83.95% 
All TSX  1,452    $2,195,859.6  100% 
Average market capitalization is estimated by talking the average of the previous 52 weeks low and high stock prices, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares.  
 
  The ownership of larger firms seems somewhat less concentrated then the average. Cumulative ownership stakes are slightly lower 
than the TSX average (Table 1, Panel A). Top 50 and 100 TSX firms have median cumulative blockholder stakes of zero. The frequency of 
cumulative ownership stakes at the 20% cut-off is around 30% for the top 50 and 100 TSX firms, increasing to almost 40% for the top 500.
  Board size and CEO compensation tend to increase with size. One would expect that larger firms have larger boards and pay their 
CEO more. Executive ownership is very small, yet it appears to be edging up slightly as smaller firms are included, and the ranking is 
gradually expanded.  Calin Valsan, 2007: A Canadian Corporate Ownership Survey 
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Table 4. Panel A: Ranking of TSX listed firms according to assets size.  
 
Cumulative 
blockholder votes 
per firm % 
Number of 
firms with  
20% /50% 
cumulative 
ownership 
stakes 
Directors 
/of which 
independent
Executive 
share 
holding 
% 
CEO cash pay 
($ mil) 
CEO 
performance 
pay ($ mil) 
Largest 50 ($ mil) 
$536,780 - $107,202.2 
           
Mean  10.3%  15/2  5.8/4.4  0.9%  $6.6  $3.1 
Median 0% -  4/2  0%  $8.3  $0.6 
Standard deviation  17%  -  4.8/5.18  2.6%  $3.9  $4 
Largest 100 ($ mil) 
$536,780 - $32,098.1 
           
Mean  11.6%  33/6  5.5/4  1.2%  $6.4  $1.8 
Median 0% -  5/3  0%  $1.9  $0.5 
Standard deviation  18.1%  -  4.3/4.5  2.6%  $4.7  $3.1 
Largest 500 ($ mil) 
$536,780 - $393.1 
           
Mean  21%  194/84  6.9/5.3  1.4%  $2.3  $1.6 
Median 11.5%  -  7/5  0%  $0.8  $0.5 
Standard deviation  27.4%  -  3.8/3.6  4.9%  $3.6  $2.7 
All 1,452 TSX firms             
Mean  23.4%  600/288  6.1/4.3  3.4%  $0.3  $1.2 
Median 13.0%  -  6/4  0%  $0.13  $0.3 
Standard deviation  7.4%  -  0.1/0.2  2.4%  $0.   
Blockholders are shareholders who control 10% or more of firm’s votes. Cumulative blockholder votes per firm are estimated by aggregating the votes of all blockholders. The number of firms with 20% 
(50%) ownership stakes is obtained by counting the firms in which blockholders control at least 20% (50%) of total votes. CEO cash pay is estimated by aggregating base salaries and cash bonuses. 
CEO performance pay is estimated by aggregating the value of stock option and restricted shares granted as reported in the management proxy circular.  
 
The ranking of TSX firms according to asset size is presented in Table 4. The frequency of cumulative blockholding stakes 20% or 
higher equals about 1/3 of the firms for the top 50 and 100, and it edges closer to 40% for the top 500. 
 
Table 4. Panel B: Average market capitalization of the largest firms.  
Largest firms by total 
assets  Number of firms  Average market capitalization per 
firm ('000) 
Total average market 
capitalization ('000) 
Percentage of 
total 
Top 50  50 $9,521.3  $476,065.0  21.68% 
Top 100  100  $6,566.4  $656,640.0  29.90% 
Top 500  500 $3,584.4  $1.792,200.0  81.62% 
All TSX  1,452    $2,195,859.6  100% 
Average market capitalization is estimated by talking the average of the previous 52 weeks low and high stock prices, multiplied by the number of outstanding shares.  
 
  Board size is similar across all rankings, decreasing in size; the CEOs of the largest TSX firms as measured by assets command by far 
the most generous pay. The average annual CEO pay for the top 50 firms is close to $10 million. Remarkably, the structure of the 
compensation package is quite different from that of the entire TSX sample. For the top 500 firms, a large proportion is paid in cash, i.e. 
59%, while only 41% is made of options, restricted shares and other forms of performance pay.  
  The top 50 firms by market capitalization largely overlap with the top 50 firms by asset size. In other words, the Canadian equity 
market is dominated by a handful of firms that account for a staggering fraction of total market capitalization, and control an overwhelming 
proportion of productive assets (Table 5).  
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Table 5. A side by side comparison of the top largest 50 TSX firms, ranked by assets and market capitalization.  
  Top largest 50 TSX firms by 
assets (TOP50A) 
Top largest 50 TSX firms by 
market capitalization 
(TOP50MC) 
Average assets ('000)  $240,052,550.5  $70,314,858 
Median assets ('000)  $209,933,143  $17,774,950 
Average market capitalization ('000)  $9,521,254  $25,465,595 
Average market capitalization ('000)  $253,985  $19,884,046 
Average annual revenues ('000)  $29,462,503  $9,457,344 
Median annual revenues ('000)  $13,104,000  $7,623,447 
Total debt ratio  50.6%  66.3% 
Long-term debt ratio  29.3%  38.1% 
Average ROA  -0.23%  5.77% 
Median ROA  0.94%  4.67% 
Average market-to-book ratio  1.48  254.3 
Median market-to-book ratio  1.76  2.95 
Average number of employees  11,639  24,244 
Median number of employees  330  7,103 
Average sales per employee ('000)  $1,114,506  $2,704 
Median sales per employee ('000)  $48,316  $392 
Average number of blockholders per firm   0.46  0.64 
Median number of blockholders per firm   0  0 
Average votes per share  1  1.07 
Firms with 20% cumulative ownership stakes  15  30 
Firms with 50% cumulative ownership stakes  2  19 
Average board size  5.9  10.49 
Median board size  4  12 
Firms with directors controlling al least 20% of votes  7  3 
Firms with directors controlling al least 50% of votes  0  2 
Average total CEO compensation ('000)  $9,730  $4,713 
Median total CEO compensation ('000)  $9,170  $3,772 
Average performance CEO compensation ('000)  $3,096  $3,980 
Median performance CEO compensation ('000)  $608  $3,349 
Total and LT debt ratios are estimated by dividing total debt and long-term debt respectively by total assets. Sales to assets ratio is calculated by dividing annual sales by total assets.  ROA ratio is 
calculated by dividing net income by total assets and owner’s equity respectively. Average market capitalization is estimated by talking the average of the previous 52 weeks low and high stock prices 
multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. Market to book ratio is calculated by dividing average market capitalization by owner’s equity. Blockholders are shareholders who control 10% or more 
of firm’s votes. Cumulative blockholder votes per firm are estimated by aggregating the votes of all blockholders. The number of firms with 20% (50%) ownership stakes is obtained by counting the 
firms in which blockholders control at least 20% (50%) of total votes. CEO cash pay is estimated by aggregating base salaries and cash bonuses. CEO performance pay is estimated by aggregating the 
value of stock option and restricted shares granted as reported in the management proxy circular.  
 
  There is a dramatic difference in the level and structure of CEO pay between the two rankings. For example, the top 50 firms by 
assets (TOP50A) pay between two and three times more in managerial compensation than the top 50 firms by market capitalization 
(TOP50MC). At the same time, the proportion of performance pay in TOP50A is much lower. The average CEO performance pay 
represents about 1/3 of total pay, while the median CEO performance pay represents a mere 7% of total pay. By contrast, the proportion of 
performance pay in TOP50MC is much higher. The average CEO performance pay represents close to 85% of total pay, while the median 
CEO performance pay represents almost 88% of total pay.  
6. Cluster Analysis 
  In order to gain further insight into the grouping of the data that might not be otherwise apparent, an exploratory two-step cluster 
analysis is employed. This methodology has the advantage of making use of both continuous and dichotomous variables. The maximum 
number of clusters has been set equal to six and the number of variables has been set equal to four: total assets (a measure of firm size), the 
province in which the corporation is headquartered, and two binary measures of ownership concentration (cumulative ownership stakes at 
the 20% and 50% cut-off). These limits have been set for obvious reasons, as too much complexity would have made the interpretation of 
the results difficult.   
  The results are presented in Table 6. The clustering procedure generates one group consisting of Very Large firms (over $80 billion in 
assets on average), two groups of relatively medium-sized firms, i.e. Medium1 and Medium2 (around $6 billion in assets on average), two 
groups of relatively smaller firms, Smaller1 and Smaller2 (around $4 billion in assets on average), and one group of Very Small firms (around $2 
billion in assets on average).  Calin Valsan, 2007: A Canadian Corporate Ownership Survey 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
297 
Table 6.  
 
 
 
Smaller1:  
Just under $4 
b 
Smaller2:  
Just over $4 b 
Very large:  
Over $ 80 b 
Medium1:  
Just over $6 b 
Medium2:  
Over $6 b 
Very Small: Just 
over $2 b  Combined 
Freq.      401 277 130  174 219 251  1,452 
%l    27.6%  19.1%  9.0%  12.0%  15.1%  17.3%  100.0% 
Mean $3,786,666.00 $4,404,183.59 $83,993,533.65 $6,192,697.08 $6,399,152.64 $2,160,430.12 $11,486,765.13 Total 
assets 
(‘000) 
Std. 
Deviation  $14,392,568.218 $16,664,873.007 $141,160,209.773 $18,763,380.380 $19,820,460.666 $8,986,608.901  $50,156,309.072 
AB Freq. 0  276 5 0 0 0 281
BC  Freq.  0  0 0 114 44 32 191
M a r i t i m e s  F r e q .   0   02 1007 2 8
MB  Freq.  0  0 10 0 0 10 20
ON Freq.  401  0 26 0 132 133 692
Other  Freq.  0  0 57 0 0 11 68
QC Freq. 0  0 4 57 41 57 159
SK  Freq.  0  0 7 0 0 0 7
20% ownership stake or larger 
0  Freq.  401  187 90 174 0 0 852
1 Freq.  0  90 40 0 219 251 600
50% ownership stake or larger 
0 Freq.  401  241 129 174 219 0 1,164
1  Freq.  0  36 1 0 0 251 288
Exploratory two-step cluster analysis. Ownership stakes of 20%(50%) or larger represent binary variables that take the value of one if the combined ownership stake of all large shareholders equals or 
exceeds 20%(50%). 
 
  The distribution of ownership stakes into these six groups largely conforms to earlier findings. The overwhelming proportion of firms 
(over 90%) with ownership stakes at the 20% cut-off belongs to the medium, smaller, and very small clusters. This result is not surprising. 
Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that firms in the medium and smaller clusters evolve in two parallel worlds. One the one hand 
we have widely-held firms accounting for the entire Smaller1 and Medium1 clusters. On the other hand we have tightly controlled firms 
making up a good portion (90 of 277 firms) of the Smaller2 cluster, and accounting for the entire Medium2 cluster. Remarkably, the Very Small 
cluster consists entirely of firms showing ownership stakes at, or above the 50% cut-off.  
  However, only 40 of the 130 Very Large firms, show ownership stakes at the 20% cut-off. This figure appears smaller than that 
reported by La Porta et al. (1999). When the 50% cut-off is used, only one of 130 Very Large firms remains closely controlled; virtually all 
firms with large blockholding stakes appear to belong to the Smaller1 and 2 and Very Small clusters.  
  The clustering by province also produces results consistent with earlier findings, although there are some additional insights to report. 
First, Atlantic Canada, Saskatchewan, and foreign listings (labeled as “Other”) are associated with Very Large firms. This is normal for foreign 
listings: in order to be cross-listed on a foreign exchange, these firms must have achieved a considerable size before they can consider issuing 
capital globally. In the case of the smaller Canadian provinces – Saskatchewan, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and NFL – this evidence 
suggests that in spite of their less diversified economies, there could be advantages that can be readily achieved through economies of scale. 
The most balanced distribution is associated with Ontario, where all groups are well represented. Given the size and complexity of its 
economy, this is hardly surprising. Alberta has an overwhelming majority of firms in the Smaller2 category. Quebec and British Columbia see 
virtually all of their corporations in the Medium1, Medium2 and Very Small groups (excepting four firms that are very large). This last result is 
very telling, given the observed ownership patterns in the two provinces. Quebec boasts a more concentrated corporate ownership than 
British Columbia, and this result cannot be attributed only to the smaller size of its corporations. Since firm size distribution is very similar in 
both provinces, something else has to account for differences in corporate ownership patterns.  
7. A Brief Note on CEO Pay 
  Although it is not the purpose of this paper to investigate exhaustively other mechanisms of internal corporate governance, one is 
naturally enticed to report and comment on a particular result that stands out in the area of executive compensation.  
  We note that Canada too has seen a steady rising in the importance of performance pay. Jensen and Murphy (1990) launched a call to 
arms of sorts when documenting low levels of performance-pay sensitivity in the 1980s. Ever since, the mantra of executive pay-performance 
has become a basic staple of the corporate governance discourse. Today, stock options and/or restricted shares make up for the majority of 
the executive compensation package. The CEO of the typical TSX firm expects to receive about 70% of his pay in the form of performance 
incentives.  
  Another result reported here shows that firms with very large assets have high levels of total executive compensation, yet a relatively 
low performance-pay component; this finding, however, fits into the empirical literature on CEO compensation [Murphy (1995)]. We also 
find that firms with higher level of ownership concentration tend to pay less in stock options and restricted shares. This is particularly true 
for firms with a significant control wedge (multiple-class shares, with a high average number of votes per share). In a similar vein, Mehran 
(1995) shows firms in which a higher percentage of the shares are held by insiders and/or large shareholders use less equity-based 
compensation. These findings warrant a brief comment.   
  There is no decisive ex-ante argument that would settle the issue of what to expect in terms of CEO compensation structure in the 
case of closely controlled firms. Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and Jensen 
(1993), the irreducible agency problem that pervade the relationship between managers and shareholders can be appeased by large 
shareholders because they internalize a significant portion of the costs associated with managerial discretion. Large shareholders have both 
the power and the incentive to monitor managers and discipline those who stray [Holderness and Sheehran (1988), Shleifer and Vishny (1986 
and 1997)]. These theoretical considerations, however, do little in terms of predicting the actual structure of a compensation package in the 
presence of large shareholders. It can be easily argued that blockholders are in a position to design better compensation packages in which 
pay is more closely related to firm performance. At the same time one could contend that since CEOs are subject to more effective scrutiny  
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and monitoring, there is really little need for a large pay-performance component. Blockholders take a more long-term approach to firm 
performance, value internal benefits of control, and rely on more diversified criteria for evaluating performance [Dechow and Sloan (1991)]. 
Options and restricted stock could very well be used only as a substitute for close monitoring by blockholders.  
  In the end, however, one feels that the results presented here fit very well into the theory of managerial rent extraction. It is noted 
that the dramatic increase in CEO compensation taking place over the last two decades has relied on the unrelenting growth in options and 
shares awarded to managers. [Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005)]. Riding on the wings of a bubbling stock market, especially during the 1990s, 
the CEOs of the publicly owned Canadian corporations have been able to extract increasingly larger rents in the form of options and 
common stock. As such, the presence of a large compensation package heavily weighted towards the pay-performance component does not 
necessarily entail more tightly aligned economic incentives; it rather suggests managerial opportunism emboldened by the market expansion. 
[Yermack (1995 and 1997)]. Options overcome to some extent the “outrage constraint” associated with large cash payments, and create the 
appearance that compensation is well deserved, especially during a bull market. Managerial power dictates the magnitude of the rent 
extraction [Bebchuk et al (2002)]. In widely-held firms, with atomized and dispersed ownership, there is a greater chance to observe higher 
CEO pay, because dispersed ownership is unable to overcome the problem of collective action. Here, CEOs wield more power.  
  Large shareholders, however, have the power and motivation to limit the rents extracted by managers.  As argued above, performance 
pay might be thus viewed as redundant and used to a lesser extent.  
8. A Recapitulation 
  It is perhaps useful to summarize the salient empirical findings of this paper. For a better perspective, these findings are compared 
and contrasted in Table 7 to those reported earlier by La Porta (1998), Morck et al. (2005), Morck and Yeung (2006), Attig and Gadhoum 
(2003), Bozec et al (2006), and Bozec and Laurin (2006).  
 
Table 7 
  La Porta et al. (1999) 
Morck et al. (2005), 
Morck and Yeung  
(2006) 
Gadhoum (2006)  
Bozec et al (2006), 
Bozec and Laurin 
(2006) 
Current paper 
Sample size 
Top 20 largest Canadian firms 
and 10 smaller firms with a 
capitalization of at least $500 
m at the end of 1995 
Various sample sizes, up 
to 500 large Canadian 
firms 
Between 1,121 and 
1,167 Canadian firms 
listed in Stock Guide in 
1996 
The largest 487 publicly 
held Canadian firms in 
1999 
1,452 corporations listed 
on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange at the beginning 
of 2007 
Proportion of firms 
with large shareholders 
(20% of votes or 
more) 
25%-30% of firms controlled 
by families  
Most likely, the controlling 
shareholder is alone 
30% of firms in 1996 
About 63% of Canadian 
corporations have 
ownership stakes of 
20% or larger 
About 82% of Quebec 
corporations have 
ownership stakes of 
20% or larger 
Quebec firms have more 
concentrated ownership 
About 41% of firms across 
the TSX have ownership 
stakes of 20% or larger. 
This figure ranges from 
62% in Quebec to 33% in 
Alberta 
There is an average of 0.93 
and a median of 1 
blockholders per firm 
Multiple-class shares 
and pyramids 
 
19.4% of shares required to 
own 20% of votes 
13% of firms with ultimate 
owners are controlled through 
pyramids 
 
Up to 50% of the assets 
of the top 100 firms 
controlled trough 
pyramids (citing Tian, 
2005) 
A 25% ownership stakes 
generates control over 
about 42% of votes 
(citing La Porta et al, 
1999) 
Quebec firms are more 
likely to have multiple-
voting shares and 
pyramid structures 
37% of closely held 
firms have multiple-
voting shares 
Quebec firms have more 
concentrated ownership 
and are more likely to 
have multiple-voting 
shares and pyramid 
structures 
For the entire TSX sample, 
the average share has 1.13 
votes, and the median 
share has 1 vote. 
Separation of 
ownership from 
control 
 
In every instance in which a 
family controls a firm, it also 
participate in its management 
 
     
Directors control on 
average 25% of votes in 
the top 500 firms with the 
most concentrated 
ownership. 
CEO pay         
Performance pay 
represents up to 80% of 
total pay for the typical 
TSX firm 
Performance pay 
represents less than 50% of 
total pay for very large 
firms (by assets), and firms 
with high concentration of 
ownership  
Side by side comparison of findings from several recent studies on the ownership of public Canadian corporations. 
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On average, corporate ownership in Canada is quite concentrated: about 40% of 
all firms have cumulative blockholding stakes of 20% or more. This is, however, less 
than the figures reported by Gadhoum (2006), but more than the figure reported by La 
Porta and al. (1999). The sample used by the latter, however is very small and consists of 
very large firms. When considering the ownership concentration of the top 50 largest 
firms in our sample, ownership concentration is not larger than that reported by La 
Porta et al. (1999).  
 The firms with the most concentrated ownership still account for a relatively 
important portion of total market capitalization, but this statement needs to be qualified. 
Up to one fourth of the total market capitalization of the TSX is accounted by 500 firms 
with the most concentrated ownership. While this figure is large it also suggests that the 
dominance of the closely controlled firm is not as dramatic as indicated by previous 
research.  
 Multiple-vote shares continue to play an important role in concentrating 
ownership. Firms such as Rogers Communications and Magna International show a significant 
control wedge, mainly due to the use of dual-class shares. In firms with a high degree of 
ownership concentration, there is a significant overlapping between ownership and 
management. One finds that 25% cumulative ownership stakes are in the hands of 
directors who are on the board of the top 500 firms with the most concentrated 
ownership. 
  It is fair to say that the Canadian market is dominated by about 500 firms or less 
that account for an overwhelming majority of assets and market capitalization. The 
concentration of economic power has two aspects: there are a handful of very large 
firms dominating the corporate landscape and another handful of firms closely 
controlled by a relatively small group of blockholders. Larger firms, however, show a 
relatively lower level of ownership concentration. As such, the dominance of the large 
firms does not necessarily engender the dominance of the closely controlled firm. The 
largest firms and the most closely controlled firms overlap to a certain degree, but the 
two groups are by no means identical.  
 Ownership patterns greatly differ between Eastern and Western Canada. The 
most concentrated ownership is found in Atlantic Canada and Quebec, and the most 
widely held firms are found in Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia.  
 CEO compensation is dominated by performance pay with a few notable 
exceptions: the largest and the most concentrated ownership firms. Also, pay 
performance is lowest for the largest firms as measured by total assets.  
9. Discussion of results 
  In this section we will present a brief discussion surrounding these results. The 
explanation of ownership patterns in Canada has been attempted before, yet most 
arguments have focused on law regime [La Porta (1998, and 1999), Bozec et al (2006)], 
private benefits of control, and taxation [Morck et al (2005)]. Here we will attempt to 
integrate various arguments into a picture that takes into account a broader range of 
historical, economic, political, and cultural factors. At times, our discussion will rely on 
speculative arguments. This is unavoidable, however, given the sheer complexity of the 
topic at hand. It is hard to envision how one should proceed to design empirical tests  
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for all of the hypotheses discussed bellow. The non-linearity and multitude of feedback 
loops present in a social and economic system would raise serious challenges to any 
methodological design.  
  Why is economic power so concentrated in Canada? There is probably no single 
explanation. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) contend that the observed ownership patterns is 
path dependent. Its characteristics represent the emerging behavior of an extremely 
complex socio-economic system.  Among the possible influences, one could cite 
demographic, geographic, historical and geopolitical patterns, cultural and religious 
heritage, taxation, and the duality of the legal system.  
 (i) Demographics. Canada is obviously a much smaller country than the United 
States. Although both countries roughly doubled their population between 1950 and 
2008 to about 303 and 33 million inhabitants respectively (according to the US Census 
Bureau), Canada has represented all along only 10% to 11% of the US population and 
economy
4. As a country, it obviously lacked the demographic critical mass necessary for 
developing an internal market with enough depth and breadth to sustain US-style 
widely-held ownership. In a smaller economy one should expect to find fewer large 
enterprises, and those that are large are expected to dominate the economy. Hence, the 
“Canadian disease” is twofold: on the one hand, a handful of large corporations are in 
control of a large proportion of productive assets, and on the other hand, a handful of 
capitalists are in control of a large proportion of the publicly held firms.   
  Canada is in part a resource-driven economy. Natural resources account for a 
large portion of its gross domestic product and exports since the late 19
th  century. 
Natural resources and commodities provide better scope for ownership concentration 
and entrenchment because they are associated with a special type of economic rents that 
rely on monopolistic ownership of critical assets that regulate and limit outsider access. 
[Rajan and Zingales (1998)]. The best way to realize economic rents is to ensure a tight 
control over critical assets and strictly regulate access [Tullock (1967)]. 
(ii) Law and Religion.  Canada shares a similar legal system with other English-
speaking countries. There is significant agreement concerning the role played by the 
legal system in generating protection for minority investors. La Porta et al (1998) finds 
that best investor rights are associated with common-law countries; not surprisingly, 
these countries also show the least concentrated corporate ownership. In reality, Canada 
is not, however, as homogeneous as other English-speaking countries. As noted already 
by Morck et al (2005), Attig et Gadhoum (2003), and Bozec et al. (2006), common-law 
co-exists with French civil law. A good portion of the Canadian gross domestic product 
is generated under a civil law regime.  As such, it is understandable that Canada will also 
resemble, to a certain extent, countries like France, Italy, Brazil, Mexico, and Spain.  
  France, Italy, Brazil, Mexico, and Spain share not only the same legal system, but 
also the same religious heritage. They are all Catholic countries. By contrast, most 
English-speaking countries are protestant. Ever since Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic 
                                                 
4  According to the US Census Bureau, www.census.gov, accessed in May 2008 
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and the Spirit of Capitalism, economists and sociologists have explained the Anglo-Saxon 
capitalist ethos in terms of religious heritage.  
  Fukuyama (1996) notes that a low trust environment - such as the one fostered 
by the Catholic culture - is more likely to produce economic organizations in which tight 
(family) control is viewed as a safeguard against the opportunism of outsiders. Banfield 
(1967) refers to this predicament as “amoral familism.” 
  Stulz and Williamson (2003) vindicate both Weber and Fukuyama. They produce 
robust results showing that indeed, the protection of investor rights tends to be weaker 
in Catholic and stronger in Protestant countries.  
 With the exception of Ireland, Canada is the country with the largest 
representation of Catholics within the English-speaking world. The second-largest 
province, Quebec is Catholic, and so are many parts of Ontario, New Brunswick, Nova 
Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and NFL, colonized by the French and the Irish. By 
comparison to the United States, where Protestantism dominates and only 24% of all 
Christians are Catholics
5, Canada continues to be dominated by Roman Catholicism, 
which represents the religious beliefs of almost 40% of the entire population
6.  
(iv) Taxation. Morck et al (2005) blame Canadian fiscal policy for the endurance of 
crony capitalism. Since the early 1920s  the dividends received by Canadian corporations 
from other Canadian corporations remained tax exempt. This obviously provided 
greater opportunities for control pyramids and inter-locking shareholding to thrive. 
Later on, provincial and federal succession taxes became significant and apparently 
compelled many families to sell out.  By the 1950s and early 1960s widely-held 
ownership in Canada was on the rise. According to Morck et all (2005), the big reversal 
occurred in the early 1970s when the Trudeau government greatly reduced succession 
taxes on large estates, and thus allowed corporate family empires to re-constitute and 
consolidate.  
(v) Nationalism. The close relationship between politicians and capitalists has 
always been a landmark of Canadian culture. This tradition has been carried over into 
the present; as Diane Francis (2008) has noted, a majority of prime-ministers in recent 
decades can be directly or indirectly linked to the powerful economic elite. 
  Canadians had always been apprehensive of American Manifest Destiny [Warner 
(1960), Berton (1980)]. The overpowering presence of the US explains in part the 
identity crisis to which Canadians have always been prone, in the same way the English 
control over Quebec explains the perennial identity crisis of Quebecers. To the outside 
observer, Canadians often seem to define themselves in contrast to Americans [Adams 
(2003), Hurtig (2003), Thomas (2007)]. Canadian national identity has been forged in the 
process of rejecting the rogue populism of the Americans [Schwartz (1967), Berton 
(1982), Cohen (2007)]. A regrouping around local elites represented thus a logical step 
taken by a populace fearful of being engulfed by its much larger neighbor. Local elites 
provided the implicit promise of leadership and protection against the imperialist 
                                                 
5  Accoording to a 2004 Gallup poll 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14446/Update-Americans-Religion.aspx 
6  According to Statistics Canada 
http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/analytic/companion/rel/canada.cfm#rc  
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ambitions of the Americans in exchange for a continuation of their privileges and 
economic status.  
 
*   *   * 
 
A summary of our findings compared to those of several previous studies is 
presented in Table 7. This current paper documents levels of corporate ownership 
concentration that are lower than those found by Gadhoum (2006). We find that only 
about 40% of Canadian public firms have cumulative ownership stakes at the 20% cut-
off, while previous studies have found this figure to equal 60%. In the case of Quebec 
firms, our finding is about 60% versus 80% ten years ago. When examining the firms 
with the most concentrated ownership it becomes clearer that they do not account for 
an overwhelming proportion of the largest Canadian firms. Both the assets and the 
market capitalization of the most tightly controlled firms are rather modest by Canadian 
historical standards. Arguably, it were not for multiple-votes shares and pyramid 
structures, it is conceivable that their dominance would be even less than what we 
observe today (this vindicates the plea of Morck and Yeung (2006) for improved 
governance).  
  What are the factors driving the trend towards a more widely-held ownership?  
The economic pragmatism of the 1990s had important consequences [Rajan and 
Zingales (2004), Rodrik (2007)]. It nurtured the liberalization of trade and financial 
markets, and it favored economic immigrants over political refugees.  A vibrant 
entrepreneurial culture combined with an expanding economy is more likely to succeed 
in dislodging the incumbent capitalist elite. This explanation is consistent with Mancur 
Olson’s (1963) growth as a destabilizing force, and Rajan and Zingales (2003) interest 
group theory. 
  The North American Free Trade Association treaty (NAFTA) came in effect in 
1994, and greatly enhanced the scope for trade and economic cooperation between 
Canada and the United States [Weintraub (2004), Hufbauer, Clyde, and Schott (2005), 
Curtis and Sydor (2006)].  It is possible that a bubbling economy, the re-assertion of a 
vibrant entrepreneurial culture, and the liberalization of trade and financial markets have 
combined together to increase the significance of widely-held firm in Canada.  
10.  Concluding Remarks 
  Canada is a complex country, with a relatively short yet eventful history, which 
has produced an intriguing story of political, social, and economic development. The 
federation, represented by a small population spread over a huge expanse of land, held 
out against all odds, and managed to find its path to prosperity, becoming one of the 
richest countries in the world. Canada’s society is multicultural and its economy is an 
amazing mix of post-colonial and post-industrial characteristics. A vibrant social 
democracy thrives alongside the still strong remnants of a slowly vanishing economic 
plutocracy.  Calin Valsan, 2007: A Canadian Corporate Ownership Survey 
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  From a historical perspective, a long-established and deeply-rooted tradition of 
economic elitism proved to be one of the more important factors shaping the Canadian 
economy. This tradition originated during the colonial period and carried over after the 
1867 Confederation. The close proximity of the United States has produced a perennial 
uneasiness among Canadians fearful of being overcome by the rogue populism of their 
neighbor. It appears that Canadians sought comfort in the presence of a small yet 
powerful oligarchy cast in the role of gate-keeper of the Canadian national identity. This 
oligarchy showed a benevolent attitude toward generous social policies, which turned 
into a barrier to foreign competition. Successive changes in inheritance taxes, together 
with regulation allowing dual-class shares might have combined to keep corporate 
ownership concentration levels high, even during periods of economic liberalization. 
The importance of commodities has most likely compounded the propensity towards 
rent-seeking behavior.  
  Regional particularities caused by law regime and cultural traditions might have 
produced differentiation of ownership patterns among provincial lines. Ownership 
stakes are higher on average in Eastern Canada (including Quebec) than in the rest of 
the country. Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia boast the most widely-held firms in 
the country.   
  Current evidence brought forward by this research shows that, nevertheless, the 
high levels of corporate ownership concentration prevalent during the 1980s and mid-
1990s have declined.  The last fifteen years have seen an unprecedented global trend 
toward openness, financial liberalization, and economic pragmatism, and Canada has 
been a prime beneficiary of this trend. Outside of the United States, Canada offers yet 
another  example of a real trend towards more widely-held ownership.  
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